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Three Concepts of Church Autonomy
Ronald R. Garet. ∗
.

In their thought-provoking papers, Professor Marci Hamilton
opposes church autonomy1 and Professor Brett Scharffs supports it.2
But it is not clear that what Professor Hamilton rejects is precisely
what Professor Scharffs endorses. In fact, it is by no means easy to
settle on an idea of church autonomy for the purpose of sorting out
whether it is a good idea or a bad one. To clarify lines of agreement
and disagreement about church autonomy, I think it useful to work
with what I will call “the composite idea of church autonomy.” The
elements of that composite I shall describe as “three concepts of
church autonomy”: formal, normative, and doctrinal.
Conceived formally, church autonomy is a certain set of jural
relations between faith communities and other rival interests such as
disaffected individual members, outsiders, or government. Conceived
normatively, church autonomy is a proposal about how the worth or
good of autonomy justifies such formal jural relations. Conceived
doctrinally, church autonomy proposes a standard of review that
specifies the content of the formal jural relations by setting out an
order of priority between, or a rule for adjusting, the worth or good
of autonomy and other goods or principles when these are rival.
It should be clear that each of the component concepts can be
worked out in a range of proposals. The content of what I shall call a
“conception of church autonomy” is given by the content of these
proposals. Thus there exists a domain of “conceptions of church
autonomy,” such that each conception in the domain answers three
questions. What are jural relations of church autonomy? On what
∗ Carolyn Craig Franklin Professor of Law and Religion, University of Southern
California Law School. I am grateful to everyone who planned, ran, and participated in the
Conference. I would especially like to thank Professor Hamilton and Professor Scharffs for
their stimulating papers and Professor Frederick M. Gedicks, Professor W. Cole Durham, and
Dean Kevin J Worthen for including me in the conference.
1. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099.
2. Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217.
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understanding of the meaning and worth of autonomy are such
relations justified? How are the jural relations to be worked out
when there are conflicting exercises or expressions of autonomy, or
when the worth of autonomy is pitted against other goods? Answers
to these questions are proposals about the formal, normative, and
doctrinal concepts of church autonomy.
Such questions identify points where understandings diverge. We
might agree on a formal description of jural relations between faith
communities and other interests but disagree about whether such
relations are desirable. We might agree that they are desirable but
disagree about whether the moral worth of autonomy is what makes
them desirable (or we might embrace quite different understandings
of the moral worth of autonomy). And even if we share a common
description of jural relations of church autonomy and a common
autonomy-based justification for these relations, we might support
different outcomes in cases if we hold different estimates of the
worth of autonomy in relation to other goods at stake.
Now, Professor Scharffs offers a “conception of church
autonomy” in the sense defined above. The heart of his conception
is a proposal about normative autonomy, a proposal he calls “interindependence.”3 This proposal, offered as a philosophical
anthropology or interpretation of the structure of personality and
sociality in relation to one another, governs Professor Scharffs’s
presentation of the jural relations and doctrinal forms of church
autonomy. By contrast, Professor Hamilton’s arguments against
church autonomy are not addressed to any particular conception of
church autonomy. Instead, her thesis is the strong one that there can
be no acceptable conception of church autonomy. Her thesis is
strong because it rules out all proposals about formal jural church
autonomy—regardless of the content of those proposals, and
regardless of whether moral backing for them is sought in the worth
of autonomy or in some other idea.
At the end of the day, however, I conclude that Professor
Hamilton’s arguments do not make out a convincing case that
formal jural relations of church autonomy are per se undesirable.
Moreover, I find much to like in Professor Scharffs’s philosophical
anthropology, the ground of his normative concept of church
3. Id. at 1251–53.
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autonomy. But I am not convinced that any conception of church
autonomy—any set of proposals about the three concepts of church
autonomy—supplies the best constitutional policy toward the life of
faith communities. Unlike Professor Hamilton, however, I will not
attempt to make out a strong “impossibility” thesis—a claim that
would, if it goes through, rule out not just one conception or a few
conceptions of church autonomy, but any set of proposals that fill
out the composite idea of church autonomy. Instead, I will merely
suggest some reservations about whether proposals about the moral
worth of autonomy really supply or should supply the normative
heart of constitutional policies regarding the life of faith
communities. Ultimately, I can say in all candor that I have learned
much from both Professor Scharffs’s and Professor Hamilton’s
papers, though I agree completely with neither of them.
Part I introduces some reservations about church autonomy—
both Professor Hamilton’s concern that church autonomy is contrary
to the rule of law and my own concerns that in debating church
autonomy we should be clear about what concepts or proposals we
are evaluating—and argues that proposals that reify the concepts of
“church” and “state” ought to be rejected. Part II elaborates the
three concepts of church autonomy and draws upon them to frame
lines of disagreement between Professors Hamilton and Scharffs. In
Part III, I engage Professor Scharffs’s normative proposals about
autonomy, both on their merits and as justifications for
constitutional policies. I urge Professor Scharffs to clarify the
definition of “inter-independence” that he proffers with his
suggestion that church and state are best understood, not as
independent or interdependent, but as “inter-independent.”4 In this
Part, I also acknowledge that Professor Scharffs’s autonomy-based
constitutional theory, like my own communality-based theory,
violates a familiar (Rawlsian) stricture on public reason. Part IV
offers my critique of Professor Hamilton’s four arguments against
church autonomy. And finally, in Part V, I briefly outline the
argument that an appreciation for communality (an interpretation of
the worth of groupness) provides a better foundation than the moral

4.

Id. at 1253–58.
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worth of autonomy on which to rest constitutional protections for
faith communities.
I. WHAT IS MEANT BY “CHURCH AUTONOMY”?
Professor Hamilton observes that “autonomy, or immunity, of
any institution—including religious institutions—from the rule of
law [is] intolerable. ‘Church autonomy’ is not and should not be a
doctrine recognized in the United States.”5 I agree that church
autonomy should be rejected if it means that religious institutions
are not subject to the rule of law, but it is not clear what church
autonomy is. Having read Professor Hamilton’s interesting paper,
anyone favorably inclined toward church autonomy should ask: If
church autonomy does not mean independence from the rule of law,
what does it mean? Another way to put the question is: What
conception of church autonomy, if any, brings into sharper focus the
choices we face about constitutional policy toward faith
communities?
The concepts of “church” and “state,” and of autonomy of the
former in relation to the latter, lend themselves to reification. We
reify “church” when we imagine that all of the threads of spirituality,
faith, and religious observance are woven into a single institutional
fabric. Religion and spirituality are not confined to churches—not
descriptively, and certainly not as a matter of constitutional law.
Instead, spiritually inflected choices, themes, expressions, and
behaviors arise in almost every scene of social life. Each of us may
find our dispositions to faith, hope, and love tested at a wedding or a
funeral, in the challenges of friendship, in a political debate, or in our
response to music or film.
Moreover, as the relevance of the transcendent and the calling to
fullness of being cannot be compressed into a space or frame called
“church,” so the norms of law and the reasons relevant to civic
deliberation and citizenship cannot readily be compressed into a
structure or function called “state.” Especially in an age in which
many people understand themselves to be “spiritual” but not
necessarily religiously affiliated—and in which law and legal concepts
touch upon (and, in a nonpositivist view, spring from) almost every
aspect of life, identity, and aspiration—we should be reluctant to
5. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1112.
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adopt any balance of power between church and state as a paradigm
of free exercise and nonestablishment principles. Any idea of church
autonomy that further entrenches the image of two spheres,
doctrinally separated or eclipsing one another like the circles in a
Venn diagram, is precisely not what we need at this stage in the
development of our faiths, cultures, and republic.
It is a great strength of Professor Scharffs’s paper that he elevates
the idea of autonomy to a level at which it constitutes our personal,
communal, and social being; it does not content itself with adjusting
relations between exogenously given entities. Autonomy is at stake
not only when obligations incurred in particular faith communities
(church) conflict with obligations undertaken through membership
in the general political community (state). It is also at stake whenever
each of us asks ourselves how far our own fate is implicated by the
fate of others. Am I most fully realized, most free of contingency,
most restored to myself, when I am independent of the will and the
gaze of others? In what ways, if any, do my dependencies upon
others, and theirs upon me, show me the deeper truth about
selfhood? Viewed one way, these are the very questions that faith
addresses. Viewed another way, they are the stakes hazarded
whenever constitutional law confronts hard cases.6 Professor Scharffs

6. The question of how far, or in what way, a terminally ill patient ought to be free to
direct the manner of his or her own death presents a hard case in just this way. If we as human
persons are fully realized just to the extent that we (rather than physicians, family members, or
community authorities) govern our bodies, then that interest in self-direction or selfgovernment supplies a reason (perhaps a strong reason) for a terminally ill patient’s right to
choose interventions intended to hasten death. But individual self-direction may be
inconsistent with, and destructive of, a different conception of selfhood—one in which our
very selves mutually implicate one another. Justice Stevens described this interrelatedness:
History and tradition provide ample support for refusing to recognize an openended constitutional right to commit suicide. . . . There is truth in John Donne’s
observation that ‘No man is an island.’. . . The value to others of a person’s life is far
too precious to allow the individual to claim a constitutional entitlement to
complete autonomy in making a decision to end that life.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740–41 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). Stevens continued, further quoting Donne, “‘No man is an island, entire of itself;
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. . . . [A]ny man’s death diminishes me,
because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it
tolls for thee.’” Id. at 741 n.8 (quoting John Donne, Meditation Number 17, in DEVOTIONS
UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 86, 87 (A. Raspa ed., 1987) (1623)).
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has shown us how these viewpoints are related to one another and to
choices about institutional arrangements.
Those choices can be exceptionally difficult ones, and as
Professor Hamilton urges, we have good reasons to reject an
institutional autonomy arrangement between church and state that
abrogates the rule of law. But the question remains: What does
count as an autonomy arrangement, and must all such arrangements
be fundamentally lawless?
II. AUTONOMY AS JURAL RELATION, AS JUSTIFICATION, AND AS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Autonomy as a Jural Relation: The Formal Concept of Church
Autonomy
“Church autonomy” is ambiguous in much the same way that
“group rights” is ambiguous. Like “group rights,” “church
autonomy” may designate a class of legal interests sharing certain
formal features: e.g., the interest belongs to a collectivity, not an
individual. Again like “group rights,” “church autonomy” may refer
to a particular (and contested) political-moral proposal, such as
reparative affirmative action (in the former case) and constitutionally
mandated Free Exercise exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability (in the latter case). Though Professor Hamilton’s
immediate target is church autonomy as a political-moral proposal,7
her argument may reach further, in much the same way that some
criticisms of reparative affirmative action extend logically to any claim
that a group can be a right-holder8 or that corrective justice can
properly consider groups as remedial units. So her critique invites the
question: What legal relations count as church autonomy relations?
As a rough starting place, and subject to the concern about
reification, we can suppose that church autonomy relations in the
formal sense are relations between a faith community and some other
public or private party, such that the faith community has what
7. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1103–05 (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause does not
authorize judges to carve out exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability).
8. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 855, 861 (1995) (acknowledging that viewing affirmative action in terms of group rights
“renders affirmative action and other group-based policies constitutionally problematic”).
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Hohfeld called an “immunity” and the other party has a Hohfeldian
“disability.”9 The immunity and the disability, as Hohfeldian
correlatives, are the same legal relation seen from the viewpoints of
the two parties. So, a faith community’s immunity from suit on the
one hand, and a party’s want of power to sue the church or a court’s
want of jurisdiction over the church on the other hand, identify the
same legal relation from two different viewpoints. Of course, to
count as church autonomy, the immunity need not be complete
protection from suit, and the correlative disability would not need to
be total. The decisive thing is the absence of liability or vulnerability
on the one side and the absence of power on the other and,
especially, the correlation of the two sides in one legal relation.
The importance of seeing the legal relation as two-sided, as
comprising a pair of jural correlatives, consists (for our purposes) in
defining “church autonomy” in a way that is neutral as to the
principles or policies that might be thought to justify the relation. To
have the form of a church-autonomy relation, it is no more essential
for the disability to derive from the right (the immunity) than for the
immunity to derive from the disability. Thus, a rule barring courts
from settling church property disputes by asking which faction has
departed from the teachings of the church is a church autonomy
doctrine in the formal (Hohfeldian) sense, whether one seeks to
justify the rule from the disability side—as, say, an Establishment
Clause limit on jurisdictional entanglement—or from the immunity
side—as, say, a Free Exercise interest in ecclesiastical selfdetermination. Notice that if the church could waive its immunity
but a court could not suspend its disability, the two sides would no
longer mirror one another, and there would no longer be a single
formal jural relation that is neutral as to its justification. If a church
has an immunity against judicial interpretation of church doctrine,
along with a power to waive that immunity, and a court has a
correlative jurisdictional disability, coupled with an ability to take
jurisdiction on the church’s waiver of its immunity, then the
aggregate legal relation would seem to be justified by respect for

9. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, AS APPLIED
36, 60–63 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).

IN JUDICIAL REASONING 8–9,
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ecclesiastical self-determination rather than by limits inherent in the
judicial role.
I will show in Part IV that church autonomy in this first (formal,
jural) sense need not abrogate the rule of law, or threaten any
credible version of the other first principles of republican
government that Professor Hamilton is concerned to protect.10 But
normative justifications of jural relations of church autonomy by
reference to conceptions of moral autonomy are controversial and
merit close scrutiny.
B. Autonomy as a Moral-Political Justification for a Jural Relation:
The Normative Concept of Church Autonomy
In the composite idea of church autonomy, “autonomy” as a
principle of practical reasonableness or as an interpretation of human
flourishing (or of the conditions for flourishing) is advanced as a
reason for jural “autonomy” relations. Churches ought to enjoy
immunities from certain forms of regulation—and government ought
to be disabled from regulating or inquiring into certain forms of
religious life or religiously motivated conduct—because such
arrangements promote moral or political-moral autonomy or some
conception of it.
In setting forth proposals about what he calls “institutional
autonomy,” as he does in Part IV of his paper, Professor Scharffs
relies implicitly upon a notion of autonomy as a correlative relation
of disability and immunity—autonomy as a set of jural relations.
Autonomy in this sense answers the question: “What are relations of
‘autonomy’ within the meaning of the phrase ‘institutional
autonomy’?” But when he justifies these proposals by grounding
them in a vision of human flourishing in and through interindependence, Professor Scharffs relies upon autonomy as an ethical
norm. Autonomy in this sense answers the question: “Why should
the law encourage or support these relations of ‘institutional
autonomy’?”
In Part III of my paper, below, I will raise some questions
specifically addressed to Professor Scharffs’s normative account, as
well as other questions for any theory (whether of autonomy or of
some other element) of the good or full life.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
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C. Autonomy as a Standard of Review: The Doctrinal
Concept of Church Autonomy
Isaiah Berlin wrote a very famous essay called Two Concepts of
Liberty.11 In that same spirit, I offer you three concepts of autonomy.
(This is a clear indication that less is more.) I have already given you
two: autonomy as a set of jural relations and autonomy as a
grounding norm (a conception of the human good that supports
those jural relations). But when we speak of “church autonomy,” we
may have in mind not only the formal character of the jural relations
and some normative idea of autonomy put forward to justify those
relations, but also a rank-ordering, a presumption or a mode of
balancing, that sets out the priority of the autonomy reasons in
relation to all of the other reasons that bear on a decision. This is
“church autonomy” in its third sense: as a standard of review that
governs administration of the jural relations.
To say that a church is “autonomous” in this third sense is to
affirm not only that considerations of moral autonomy supply
reasons for a two-sided relation of church immunity and
governmental disability, but also that these moral autonomy reasons
take priority over some other reasons, at least under specified
circumstances. A church’s immunity is qualified, or governmental
disability is lifted, when these other reasons, appropriately
considered, outweigh the moral reasons for the immunity/disability.
So Professor Scharffs observes that
[o]ne of the strategies that will often be adopted under a
conception of inter-independence is heightened scrutiny, where
under the autonomy interests of individuals (Is there a substantial
burden placed upon religious observance?) will be weighed against
the autonomy interests of the state (Is there a compelling state
interest and is the policy narrowly tailored to accomplish that
interest?).12

I think, though, that the point is somewhat stronger. Unless
doctrine instructs judges that only certain reasons of a very high
order of magnitude take priority over the moral reasons for

11. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
12. Scharffs, supra note 2, at 1311 (emphasis omitted).

1357

4GAR-FIN

12/1/2004 7:37 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2004

institutional (or individual) autonomy, there is no relation of
immunity and disability worthy of being called “church autonomy”
(or “personal autonomy”).
When Professor Hamilton charges church autonomy with being
fundamentally contrary to the rule of law, she has (particularly) in
mind doctrines that elevate institutional autonomy reasons over
other regulatory reasons, namely, doctrines that fail to give
regulatory reasons the weight they merit in a republican form of
government in which law serves the public good. I will return to
those objections in Part IV, below. But even if, as I think, those
objections are not persuasive, Professor Scharffs’s particular version
of church autonomy raises other questions which I now pursue.
III. PROFESSOR SCHARFFS’S THEORY
Professor Scharffs’s theory presents a conception of church
autonomy. Professor Scharffs offers a normative idea of autonomy,
an interpretation of the worth of autonomy in the fullness of life, as
his motivation for jural relations of church autonomy. In this Part of
my paper, I will begin by exploring an ambiguity in Professor
Scharffs’s interpretation of the worth of autonomy. Resolving this
ambiguity, I suggest, is of some importance in analyzing and
deciding constitutional questions. But even if the ambiguity is
resolved, the very idea of resting constitutional proposals on
contested conceptions of moral autonomy raises familiar and serious
questions of legitimacy in constitutional argument. In particular,
Professor Scharffs presents moral autonomy as an interpretation of
the human condition. And grounding constitutional proposals on a
philosophical anthropology may offend important principles of
justice and republican government. But if Professor Scharffs’s
interpretation of moral autonomy is problematic when turned to
account in political argument, so is my own interpretation of
communality or groupness, and for just the same reasons. I conclude
this Part by sketching very briefly why these reasons are not
conclusive.
In Professor Scharffs’s hands, moral autonomy as a reason for
legal policy is an interpretation of the good or worthy life for
humankind. Professor Scharffs contrasts three such interpretations or

1358

4GAR-FIN

1349]

12/1/2004 7:37 PM

Three Concepts of Church Autonomy

conceptions of the autonomy principle or autonomy good—
independence, interdependence, and inter-independence13—each of
which could support a distinctive composite theory of church
autonomy. Among these conceptions, Professor Scharffs favors interindependence,14 a view of autonomy that emphasizes mutual respect.
In this view, people are to engage one another in respectful and
inclusive ways. This is a vision of human flourishing in which we
realize our personal lives through mutual respect and mutual
engagement.
Now, Professor Scharffs is not always consistent in this respect.
Some of the time, when he talks about inter-independence, he really
means it as a conception of autonomy.15 But at other times, it slips
into being a set of social conditions for the realization of that
conception.16 These are two different things. I invite Professor
Scharffs to sort out more clearly inter-independence as a real concept
of human flourishing and inter-independence as a prescription for
the social conditions within which that concept is actualized.
The Newdow case17 illustrates the difference. Does a school
district’s policy that directs teachers to lead students in affirming
“one nation under God” violate the Establishment Clause? Consider,
in this respect, the autonomy of the schoolchild. Is that autonomy to
be understood as some set of capacities that are distinctively hers? If
so, we could measure how well any proposed educational policy (like
the district’s Pledge recitation policy), any constitutional policy (such
as an interpretation of the Establishment Clause), or any assignment
of custody rights and obligations between her parents would advance
(or undermine) these capacities. On this view, the educational,
constitutional, and custodial policies are evaluated by how well they
supply social conditions for the promotion of the girl’s autonomy.
But the child’s autonomy might be understood differently: not as
her capacities (or not exclusively so), but as her relations. Her

13. Id. at 1246–58.
14. Id. at 1253–58.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004) (refusing
to reach the merits of the case, the Court held that the father lacked standing to bring the
suit).
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relations with her mother and father are constituents of her selfhood,
and if we assume no special family pathology, we can say that these
constituents are worthy of respect in their own right (whether
viewed from the child’s standpoint or from those of either parent).
But it is equally plausible that her relations with her country and its
fundamental law might be viewed as constituents of her selfhood and
hence of her self-direction. On this view, what she means when she
says “my mommy,” “my daddy,” and “my country” are all equally at
stake in any decision about the decisional issue itself—the issue of
who decides whether she is to be exposed each day to a collective
pledging of allegiance to “one nation under God.”
The distinction I have been drawing and illustrating, between a
conception of autonomy and a view about the social conditions that
favor or advance autonomy so conceived, belongs to the second of
the three senses of autonomy. Is “inter-independence” a set of social
conditions that favor development of the child’s (independently
measurable) capacities for self-direction, or is it an interpretation of
the child’s selfhood? But it is clear that Professor Scharffs is also
talking about autonomy in the third sense: autonomy as a standard
of review that implements autonomy in the second sense and
governs or regulates autonomy in the first sense. Professor Scharffs’s
proposal about church autonomy in the third sense presents a
standard of review with two features. First, Professor Scharffs stresses
that it is contextualized.18 So, we pay close attention to the context
in which individual autonomy—the autonomy of the church and of
the state—are at stake. Are we talking about public schools? Are we
talking about monuments? What’s the context?
The second dimension of the standard of review is balancing. To
decide the issue before it a court must strike a balance between state
autonomy, individual autonomy, and church autonomy.19 Wisconsin
v. Yoder20 may serve as an example. In Yoder, the Court had to
decide whether Amish and Mennonite communities were

18. Scharffs, supra note 2, at 1292.
19. Id. at 1258–1328.
20. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a further discussion of Yoder in terms of personhood
(compare individual autonomy), communality (compare church autonomy), and sociality
(compare state autonomy), see Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of
Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1006–18, 1029–35 (1983).
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constitutionally entitled to a partial exemption from state
compulsory schooling laws.21
Viewed from the standpoint of inter-independence, the
autonomy of the state in Yoder would be the state’s undertaking to
foster the conditions within which republican discourse and
deliberation are possible. People are socialized into the common
good. Respectful of law, they are cognizant of the concepts within
which the republic operates. In church autonomy, we have the
ability of the Amish and Mennonite communities to maintain their
traditional way of life. But individual autonomy is also at stake, and
in different ways. Healthy communities, including communities
centrally organized around faith traditions, empower and enable
individual lives. But as Justice Douglas worried in his Yoder dissent,
withdrawing children too soon from schooling might indoctrinate
them into the faith tradition and not enhance their autonomy.22 So it
seems fair enough to see the decision in Yoder as requiring a balance
between state autonomy, church autonomy, and individual
autonomy.
Now, Yoder is a good case for us to think about in this
connection because the Amish and Mennonite communities that
sought exemption from the state compulsory schooling laws do not
share Professor Scharffs’s commitment to the inter-independent
concept of autonomy. Their faith tradition teaches a much more
insular or sectarian ideal. How then is it legitimate within a
constitutional system to build an interpretation of the Religion
Clauses on a controversial conception of the human good that the
Amish and the Mennonites do not share? Would it not be
paradoxical to rest their exemption on a theology of the human
condition which they reject? So, scholars like John Rawls have urged
us to build our constitutional principles on some foundation other
than metaphysical or theological conceptions of autonomy because
such conceptions are the wrong place to look for political argument
in a liberal republic under modern conditions of reasonable
pluralism.23

21. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
22. Id. at 245–46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
23. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
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In Part V, I will suggest that an appreciation for communality or
supportive union (an interpretation of the worth of groupness)
provides a better foundation than autonomy on which to rest
constitutional protections for faith communities. But Professor
Scharffs’s normative view of autonomy as inter-independence is so
thoroughly relational that the difference between us may not be very
great.24 Whether, at their margins, conceptions of autonomy and of
communality begin to converge (on the ground of mutuality or
mutual commitment), or whether at the end of the day they remain
distinct ideas naming distinct (even rival) human goods, the fact
remains that both Professor Scharffs’s proposals and my own are
equally metaphysical, and so equally fall under the interdict of
Rawlsian public reason.
I think that the two of us can say that, in support of our theories
and in reply to Rawls, constitutional issues such as those presented in
Yoder are hard because they expose fractures or faultlines in the most
basic structures of our social life. The relevant constitutional
doctrines are inconclusive not because they are ill-considered or
superficial but because they are sensitive to the tragic possibilities of
human existence. When the state, through its compulsory schooling
laws, acts on its most generous hope that all are (or will become)
equal members of civil society, it paradoxically gives some insular
groups less than equal regard for their life commitments.25 When the
insular group acts to preserve the truth entrusted to it, the group
paradoxically enforces that truth upon itself in such a way that some
of the children will receive it not as a truth but as an enforced regime
that cuts off the free acceptance without which one cannot be a
trustee of a truth. The drama of Yoder is a tragedy. Goodness and
fault are inextricable from one another. There is no solution other
than that supplied by the tragic sense of life, fully admitting the
claims of the rival gods. This is the burden of what we call the
24. The features of Professor Scharffs’s understanding of autonomy that I find most
attractive are the features most remote from “autonomy” in the sense of auto-nomos (self-rule,
self-legislation). See Scharffs, supra note 2, Part III. But when a word like “autonomy” slips its
moorings and begins to mean almost everything, it risks meaning almost nothing. This has
been the fate of “privacy” as a substantive due process concept, and it could easily be the fate
of “autonomy” as a First Amendment concept.
25. On this paradox, see the important essay by my colleague, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
“He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a
Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
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“standard of review” in such a case. We confess the metaphysical
roots of our suffering because these roots are real, our suffering is
real, and honor compels us to face these realities, whether we choose
as Creon (whose convictions carried the force of state power) or as
Antigone (whose convictions, though apparently not backed by state
power, nonetheless articulated “law” in some significant sense).
Perhaps Professor Scharffs has a better answer to the Rawlsian
objection. He may feel that with an ally like me, he would be better
off with an enemy. But now aware of—though perhaps not
discouraged by—this difficult and pressing problem about the
legitimacy of metaphysical reasoning in constitutional argument, let
us return to Professor Hamilton’s criticism of church autonomy.
IV. FOUR ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHURCH AUTONOMY
Professor Hamilton advances four arguments against church
autonomy. I will call these, first, the argument from the rule of law;
second, the argument from the republic as oriented to a public good
and not to a private good; third, the argument from the no-harm
principle; and fourth, (somewhat facetiously, I admit) the “argument
from Torquemada” (which tells you that if you do not like the
Inquisition, you should not like Sherbert v. Verner26). I do not think
that any of these arguments are tenable, and I will try to briefly
explain why. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will treat each of
these arguments as considerations of political morality that either
stand or fall on their own merits. Professor Hamilton, though,
presents them as interpretations of our constitutional history. I will
assume for the purpose of analysis that Professor Hamilton is correct
in all of her historical claims. But I also assume that an argument of
political morality that fails on its own terms carries little additional
weight just because of history.
As I have said, the idea of church autonomy is ambiguous, so
some work is needed to tease out which sense of such autonomy—
either the formal sense (correlative jural relations of immunity and
disability), the normative sense (jural relations justified by a

26. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits to an Adventist employee, who declined to work on her Saturday Sabbath, violated her
Free Exercise rights).
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conception of moral or moral-political autonomy), or the standardof-review sense—is vulnerable to the four arguments. Professor
Hamilton’s arguments have least traction against formal jural
relations of church autonomy. While she shows that some reasons
that might be offered to support and specify such relations are poor
justifications for autonomy (such as a claim to be above the law),
Professor Hamilton does not consider other reasons (such as the
moral autonomy account offered by Professor Scharffs). At the end
of the day, Professor Hamilton has not shown that no conception of
church autonomy is or could be consistent with first principles of the
rule of law, of republican government, or of the liberal state.
A. The Argument from the Rule of Law
Is church autonomy, just as a set of jural relations (immunities
on the one side, disabilities on the other), contrary to the idea (or
ideal) of the rule of law? If so, this would be a curious and
provocative state of affairs, since we have systems of immunities
throughout constitutional law. Take Tenth Amendment immunities
as an example. In some quarters such immunities are celebrated as
instruments of federalism,27 while in others they are scorned as
rearguard actions vainly defending an outdated regime of states’
rights.28 But these are substantive political assessments. Opponents
of Tenth Amendment immunities, or of a robust set of such
immunities, do not suppose that institutional immunities for states
are ruled out preemptively by the ideal of the rule of law.
As an example of a Tenth Amendment immunity, let us take the
conception in National League of Cities v. Usery.29 Ultimately the
Tenth Amendment immunity was rejected. But suppose that federal
regulations violate the Tenth Amendment if they displace integral
operations in areas of traditional state government functions. Now,

27. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the
Constitution in Plato’s Cave, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 554 (2000) (“The fact that we
even have a Tenth Amendment demonstrates the reality behind it and imposes on the Court a
duty to define the enumerated powers in such a way that the states are not relegated to
irrelevance and, ultimately, extinction.”).
28. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the
Tenth Amendment?, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 161.
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
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such a standard may be good or bad constitutional policy, but it
surely does not violate the idea or ideal of the rule of law. Although
its key concepts are somewhat vague, they are not vaguer than many
other constitutional concepts and certainly not so vague as to cause
the standard to fail to meet law’s minimum standards of
intelligibility.30 Since the concepts protect the operations of state
government as such, they are appropriately general in their form, as
they would not be if they protected only selected favored states.
Generality is not defeated simply because a zone of state immunity is
shielded from what would otherwise be the valid operations of
federal law. True, under the National League of Cities test,31 some
federal laws would apply less generally (widely) than they otherwise
might, but this is acceptable because public goals supporting that
wider application are made to give way to public goals supporting
the zone of immunity.
If church autonomy operated as a set of immunities analogous to
the immunities in National League of Cities, such autonomy would
no more violate the rule of law than would state autonomy. It is
true, however, that some versions of immunities for churches are
strongly disanalogous. The version of immunities rejected in
Employment Division v. Smith.32 was disanalogous because, unlike the
National League of Cities test, it was controlled by no common
standard to pick out the zone of institutional decision to be shielded
from otherwise valid law. The Smith Court disclaimed any authority
to ascertain what is (and what is not) a “traditional religious
function” and what is (and what is not) an “integral operation” of
churches performing that function. It assumed, according to
Professor Hamilton, that to let each religious community decide for

30. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969). Here I follow
Fuller’s account of eight rule-of-law virtues, including intelligibility and generality. For present
purposes, it does not matter whether these virtues are understood as moral properties that
confer legitimate authority or as merely functional values. See Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law
and Its Limits, 23 LAW & PHIL. 1, 38–43 (2004).
31. 426 U.S. at 855 (“Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
government functions are to be made.”).
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise clause does not require
government to exempt religiously motivated conduct from the operation of generally
applicable regulations).

1365

4GAR-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/1/2004 7:37 PM

[2004

itself when (and for what reason) it opts out of an otherwise valid
regulatory framework is to defeat the rule of law.33
But notice that there are only two logical possibilities here, and
neither of them supports a strong claim that church autonomy, just
as a set of jural correlatives (immunities and disabilities), violates the
rule of law. The first possibility is that the Court in Smith was wrong
to be so squeamish about determining just what a traditional
religious function is and just what choices are integral to those
functions. If the Establishment Clause does not require a court to be
so fastidious, then a National League of Cities approach to church
autonomy is legitimate and no more violates the rule of law as a
church-autonomy (First Amendment) doctrine than as a state
autonomy (Tenth Amendment) doctrine. The second possibility is
that the Court in Smith was correct, and the Establishment Clause
does require courts to refrain from making the judgments about
churches that the National League of Cities standard asks courts to
make about states. But this is just an example of a constitutionally
required governmental disability, whose jural correlative is a religious
immunity; in other words, it is an example of a church-autonomy
doctrine in the Hohfeldian sense.34 If such doctrine violates the rule
of law, then we have the paradoxical result that the rule of law is
violated either way. Since that cannot be correct, it seems that
church autonomy in the formal sense does not violate the rule of
law.
If the best understanding of the Establishment Clause rules out a
church autonomy doctrine that would be to churches what National
League of Cities was to the states, it remains to consider whether the
rule of law bars states from discretionarily enacting certain regulatory
exemptions, even though these exemptions are not compelled by the
Free Exercise Clause (as they were, or were thought to be, in
33. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 146. See, in addition, Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, for a discussion of the anomalous character of constitutionally
mandated exemptions for religiously motivated conduct. Although Professors Hamilton and
Dane helpfully integrate Justice Scalia’s arguments for the Court in Smith with widely shared
general principles of American constitutionalism, I am not convinced that the peculiar features
of the exemptions regime that Smith rejected are really that extraordinary. For example, the
privilege against self-incrimination, like the Free Exercise immunities protected in Yoder and
Sherbert, is exercisable at the option of the party protected by the immunity and, if exercised,
may frustrate legitimate social goals.
34. See supra Part II.A.
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Yoder).35 Ordinarily, the generality requirement of the rule of law36
does not require a lawmaker to extend the scope of a rule (or of an
exemption or exception) to the frontier defined by whatever norm or
goal justifies the rule (or the exemption). Generality’s minimal
demands are met when the lawmaker classifies in general terms, so
that members across the class enjoy the benefits or burdens of the
rule or exemption. For example, the lawmaker is permitted to
proceed “one step at a time,” providing for a class that is general
even though it is not universal (in relation to the norm or goal
toward which the law “proceeds”). But if the Establishment Clause
makes it impossible in principle for government to identify a class of
religious actors or religious conduct that is most deserving of
exemption, then there simply is no general goal toward which the
lawmaker can be thought to be “proceeding” (albeit one step at a
time). On that assumption, an exemption framed in terms of a
general class, and which would ordinarily pose no generality
problem, might fail to be adequately general because no such
exemption could be adequately general (in that every generality
would involve the government in making an illegitimate assumption
about religious function or the centrality of conduct to that
function).
B. The Argument from the Republic as Oriented to a
Public Good and Not a Private Good
It seems, then, that the ideal of the rule of law is not offended by
church autonomy in the formal jural sense. If we do not like church
autonomy, what we dislike is substantive, not formal; and we dislike
it (as we might dislike the National League of Cities standard) for
substantive reasons of constitutional policy, not because it is contrary
to foundational norms like the idea of the rule of law. But Professor
Hamilton advances a second objection: that church autonomy is
inconsistent with the proposition that in a republic our laws are
oriented to a public good rather than a private good. Here again we
have an argument whose target is very broad and whose foundation

35. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
36. FULLER, supra note 30, at 46–49.
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rests not on intermediate political or sociological premises but on
first principles.
But it is not hard to identify a public good to which a Yoder-like
regime of Free Exercise mandated exemptions could be oriented.
You could call it “tolerance” or “pluralism.” You could call it
“respect for different incommensurable or ultimate conceptions of
meaning and value.” And even if one were not persuaded that any of
these public goods justified such a regime (which is different from
being unpersuaded that these goods are genuinely public), it would
not follow that church autonomy (the more inclusive class of jural
relations) must be unsupported by a public good. Establishment
Clause justifications put forward to justify governmental disabilities,
such as those discussed in Part II.A, surely sound in public-regarding
rather than private-regarding reasons. Moreover, the argument from
the republic as oriented to a public good and not a private good
assumes the awesome burden of proving a negative—not merely that
none of the familiar justifications for church autonomy is publicregarding, but that no such justification could ever be publicregarding. This is a very strong negative claim and proportionately
difficult to prove.
C. The Argument from the No-Harm Principle
Professor Hamilton’s third argument against church autonomy
rests on the premise that the exercise of rights does not extend to
harming others. But almost every right covers conduct that is not
purely self-regarding, including conduct whose consequences for
others include injurious effects. In fact, as Joseph Singer pointed out
in a seminal article on analytical jurisprudence, Hohfeld’s framework
of jural correlatives (from which I take the relation of immunity and
disability to be the formal structure of church autonomy) revealed
precisely that “much of the legal system consisted of rules that
allowed people to harm others” and enabled policymakers to see
clearly that “[t]here were good reasons to allow people to act in ways
that harmed the interests of others.”37

37. Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 985; see also Jack Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law
and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990).
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Constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, can also
be conceptualized in Hohfeldian terms. Balkin aptly expresses this
idea:
[M]y right of freedom of speech is defined by my right to inflict
emotional injury on you when I say things that you do not like, as
well as your nonright to prevent me from doing so and the
government’s duty to protect me in my infliction of injury on
you.38

The American Nazis’ plan to march in Skokie surely harmed, and
was meant to harm, the Holocaust survivors who lived in that
community. Invalidation of the community’s attempts to stop the
march vindicated rights without denying that the exercise of these
rights, even the threatened exercise of these rights, would inflict
harm upon others.39
The analysis does not change if we think that any adjudication of
the constitutionality of Skokie’s countermeasures against the
threatened march would require that two rival sets of rights, those of
the community of Holocaust survivors in Skokie and those of the
prospective marchers, be appraised and prioritized in relation to one
another. Doctrinal frameworks that allow for the conflict of rights
simply multiply the no-harm principle’s inherent difficulties.
Consider, in this respect, the problem presented in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protection Association40 in which the United States
Forest Service wanted to build a logging road through Forest Service
land, which, of course, was government property. Some Native
Americans regarded that land as sacred to their faith. If the
government builds the logging road, it desecrates the land and
disables the joy and the sacredness that comes from the sacred space.
However, if the sacredness of this space is honored, the government
cannot make full use of its property right. We have conflicting uses.

38. Balkin, supra note 37, at 1122.
39. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
40. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). For further discussion of Lyng along the lines suggested here,
see Ronald R. Garet, Dancing to Music: An Interpretation of Mutuality, 80 KY. L.J. 893, 940–
48 (1992).
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By showing in a new economic light what Hohfeld’s framework
of jural correlatives had already disclosed to us—that “harms”
(externalities) are not properties of actions or objects but reciprocal
relationships—the Coase Theorem41 helps us see that such
conflicting uses are not the exception but the norm. Coase also tells
us that in the absence of transaction costs and inalienability rules,
market transactions will transfer the use right to the party who values
it more.42 It is hard to imagine a church autonomy rule that would
enable such a transfer, at least in cases like Lyng. If the Forest Service
is assigned the use right, the Indians cannot buy it; if the Indians are
assigned the right, the Forest Service cannot buy it. As this result
makes it implausible that any assignment of the right could be
reconciled with the no-harm rule, it also lends some support to
Professor Hamilton’s worry about church autonomy and the public
good (in the narrow sense that when the use right cannot be
transferred to the party who values it more, the market mechanism
cannot expand overall social welfare). But the worry applies
symmetrically to both possible assignments of the use right. Neither
assignment to the government nor to the “church” enables a
welfare-expanding transfer. Neither assignment is for a “public
good” in that (perhaps somewhat restrictive) sense.
D. The Argument from Torquemada
Finally, Professor Hamilton argues (perhaps I oversimplify) that
if you do not like the Inquisition, you should not like church
autonomy. But the Inquisition, the rack to which Professor
Hamilton refers us, is not an illustration of church autonomy. The
rack is an illustration of the opposite. The rack is an illustration of
government and religion working together and government force
being applied coercively to advance religious faith (or, more
precisely, a horrible mockery of religious faith). I understand the
church autonomy concepts to drive in the opposite direction. If you
do not like the rack and the screw, you still have to think through
the hard question of whether you like some set of governmental

41. DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY
POLICY 119–31 (3d ed. 1990); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
42. Coase, supra note 41, at 15–19.
TO
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disabilities whose correlative is church immunity, or some set of
church immunities whose correlative is governmental disability. The
burden of my argument has been that first principles—such as the
idea of the rule of law, the premise that republican government is
oriented to a public not a private good, the no-harm rule, and the
disfavored status of torture (whether inflicted by those who purport
to act for religion, government, or some combination of both)—do
little to specify which disability/immunity packages (if any) are
acceptable and which (if any) are not.
V. AUTONOMY, COMMUNALITY, AND RIGHTS-BASED
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHURCH AUTONOMY
I return now to Professor Scharffs’s theory. Discussing autonomy
in the second of the three senses I have distinguished—that is,
autonomy as a principle of practical reasonableness or as a notion of
human flourishing—Professor Scharffs refers to Kant and to Sartre.43
I think if they were here with us these two notable moralists would
be unhappy that autonomy, which they understood in their different
ways as a moral stricture pertaining to personal agents, is broadened
or flattened out in its meaning so as to extend to institutions and
groups. For Kant, we are autonomous agents in the sense that as
persons we are members of a kingdom of ends.44 We live in the realm
of necessity and also in a realm of freedom.45 That is our unique
transcendence or opportunity as persons. I do not know that Kant
thought that organizations straddle that boundary.
Professor Scharffs refers also to Sartre’s concept of the “foritself.”46 Sartre was explicit that only the individual consciousness is
the for-itself. There is no Mitsein for Sartre, no group for-itself.
Groups are Masochism or Sadism. Groups are one for-itself making
another into an object.47
43. Scharffs, supra note 2, at 1248–51.
44. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 100–02 (H.J.
Paton trans., 1964).
45. Id. at 114.
46. Scharffs, supra note 2, at 1249 n.111.
47. For a discussion of Kant and Sartre in connection with the question of whether
there is a metaphysical interpretation of or foundation for the rights of groups, see Garet, supra
note 20, at 1065–75.
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There is every possibility that I have misunderstood Kant and/or
Sartre, and even if I have not—even if their conceptions of autonomy
resist extension to groups or institutions—it may be that other
conceptions of autonomy are not so resistant. But are we welladvised to take a concept (autonomy) that has its home in the
personal life and extend it (in the form of church autonomy and state
autonomy) to the group and the social levels?
Are there not other aspects of the human good that belong more
centrally to group life? The joy that comes with communion, the joy
of worship, the reality of being and belonging together, being a part
of something that does not die in the way that the embodied human
person dies—these are sustaining goods, as is the opportunity for
relationships of mutuality and self-giving, in which we make and
deepen commitments to love and provide for one another. These
goods figure prominently in the worth of communities, including
faith communities.
In an earlier essay, I wrote about the worth as well as the
vulnerability of relations of supportive union and drew upon (what I
called) “pastoral hymns to communality” to illustrate and affirm
these relations.48 The sublimity of the landscape that forms the
natural setting for our moral efforts not only motivates and soothes
us but elevates our understanding of what we share with one
another. The pastoral hymn to communality enables us to say, and in
saying more deeply hope, that the worth of this sharing cannot be
negated or defeated by time and by our own mortality.
Dean Worthen, the words of the hymn that you read to us this
morning when you opened our conference lend articulate form to
these ideas. Just as you said, the beautiful mountains that we
admired as we came to the law school to begin our work at the
conference today direct our attention to the faith communities in
which we live. If the mountains we see supply metaphors for our
scholarly effort, the mountains we sing metamorphose beyond
metaphor, becoming guarantors of the life we share together.
For the strength of the hills we bless thee,
Our God, our fathers’ God;
Thou hast made thy children mighty

48. Garet, supra note 40, at 940–48.
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By the touch of the mountain sod.
Thou hast led thy chosen Israel
To freedom’s last abode;
For the strength of the hills we bless thee,
Our God, our fathers’ God.
Thou hast led us here in safety
Where the mountain bulwark stands
As the guardian of the loved ones
Thou hast brought from many lands.
For the rock and for the river,
The valley’s fertile sod,
For the strength of the hills we bless thee,
Our God, our fathers’ God.49

Thank you for beginning our day with these words. We resonate
with them so powerfully because the mountains bring home to us
what endures, what is stronger than we are, and what is other than
us and yet is the ground of our being. That is joy and communion.
It is not autonomy. It is a joy and communion that preserve us here
in freedom’s last abode.

49. Felicia D. Hemans (adapted by Edward L. Sloan), For the Strength of the Hills, in
HYMNS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 36 (1985).
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